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Abstract 
This article examines the creation and implementation of pretrial Special Administrative 
Measures [SAMs], a version of pretrial solitary confinement now used most often to confine 
terror suspects in the federal criminal justice system.  Through an in-depth archival study, this 
article brings attention to the importance of 20th century criminal justice trends to the 21st 
century response to the threat of terrorism, including an increasingly preventive focus and 
decreasing judicial checks on executive action. The findings suggest that practices believed to be 
excessive responses to the threat of terrorism are in fact a natural outgrowth of late modern 
criminal justice. 
 
Introduction  
 In Spring of 2007, Syed Fahad Hashmi was extradited to the United States and 
immediately placed in solitary confinement.1  Hashmi had been arrested in the United Kingdom 
nearly a year prior to his extradition, and accused of involvement in terrorism.2  The conditions 
of his confinement in the United States were not limited simply to normal solitary confinement—
three months after his extradition he was placed under Special Administrative Measures [SAMs]3 
whereby his visits from his family and attorneys (the only visits he was permitted) were 
                                                          
1 Letter to Attorney General Michael Mukasey from the Brennan Center for Justice, 10/20/2008, 
available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/301ff4d661c066cf21_p7m6brynx.pdf  hereafter “Brennan 
Letter.” 
2 Id. 
3 Democracy Now transcript “’Guantanamo At Home’: Muslim American Syed Fahad Hashmi 
Held in 23-Hour Pre.-Trial Solitary Confinement for Over Two Years in Case Resting on Plea-
Bargaining Government Informant.”  Originally aired 6/5/09.  Available at 
http://www.democracynow.org/2009/6/5/hashmi  hereafter “Guantanamo At Home.” 
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monitored, all communication with media outlets was forbidden, any news via television or radio 
was forbidden, and he was allowed newspapers only after a 30-day delay.4  His family visits 
were limited to one visit, from one family member, every other week, and subjected to the 
bureaucratic difficulties of the Bureau of Prison’s monitoring practices, such that these visits 
might be forgone if the Bureau of Prisons translator failed to appear at the appointed time.5  He 
was subjected to a strip search before his one hour per day of exercise, which eventually led him 
to choose to forego leaving his cell altogether.6  According to Hashmi’s brother, even his own 
speech (presumably to himself) within his cell was restricted.7  Three years into Hashmi’s 
confinement, his brother was quoted as saying that the limited family visits had been impossible 
for five months.8   
The conditions of confinement allowed under SAMs are exceptionally harsh.  After two 
and a half years in solitary, Hashmi’s supporters believed his mental health was deteriorating, 
stating he looked “frail” and “jittery.”9  This conforms well to the criticisms that have been 
lodged at the use of solitary confinement in the terrorism context and elsewhere—critics argue 
that the use of solitary confinement should be deemed a violation of the Eighth Amendment due 
                                                          
4 Brennan Letter, supra note 1. 
5 Democracy Now transcript “Guantanamo At Home,” supra note 3. 
6 Open Letter from Amnesty International USA, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and the 
Council on American Islamic Relations-NY on the upcoming trial of Syed Fahad Hashmi and the 
severe Special Administrative Measures to which he is subjected, 4/23/10, available at 
http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2010/04/23-2  . 
7 Democracy Now, “Guantanamo At Home,” supra note 3. 
8 Democracy Now “After 3 Years in Pretrial Solitary Confinement, Fahad Hashmi Pleads Guilty 
on Eve of Terror Trial.”  4/28/10.  Available at 
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/28/after_3_years_in_pretrial_solitary.   
9 Democracy Now “Hashmi Remains in Solitary Confinement as Trial Delayed.”  12/8/09.  
Available at http://www.democracynow.org/2009/12/8/headlines#15 .   
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to the extreme mental and emotional harm it inflicts on inmates.10 SAMs are a form of 
Administrative Supermaximum Security confinement (ADMAX), in which the conditions of 
confinement are based on the danger that inmates pose (according to the BOP, and often based 
on the inmate’s status as a gang member). Because ADMAX is status-based it is indefinite in 
duration, so that prisoners who are believed to be dangerous may be housed in ADMAX for their 
entire prison sentence.11.  Because it is administrative, it is subject to little, if any, judicial 
oversight.12  In the case of SAMs, this status is meant to be based on a determination that SAMs 
are reasonably necessary, either to “protect persons against the risk of death or serious bodily 
injury,”or to “prevent disclosure of classified information.”13  
But Hashmi was held under SAMs without any claim that he posed this type of 
immediate danger.  He had provided aid to terrorists, in the form of socks, blankets, money and 
the use of a phone, but there was no claim that he himself would or could engage in terrorist acts, 
or direct others to do so.14  This made him a focal point for criticism of the “reflexive” use of 
                                                          
10 See, e.g. Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long Term Solitary and “Supermax” 
Confinement. 29 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 124 (2003); Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary 
Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115 (2009); Holly Boyer, Home Sweet 
Hell: An Analysis of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause as Applied 
to Supermax Prisons, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 317 (2003); Christine Rebman, Eighth Amendment and 
Solitary Confinement: The Gap in Protection from Psychological Consequences, 49 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 567 (1999-2000); Bryan Walton, Eighth Amendment and Psychological Implications of 
Solitary Confinement, 21 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 271 (1997); Atul Gawande, “Hellhole.”  The 
New Yorker March 30, 2009.  Available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/03/30/090330fa_fact_gawande  ;   Jeffrey Kluger 
“Are Prisons Driving Prisoners Mad?” Time Magazine Jan. 26, 2007 Available At 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1582304,00.html . 
11 Haney, Id. 
12 Keramet Ann Reiter, The Most Restrictive Alternative: A Litigation History of Solitary 
Confinement in U.S. Prisons 1960-2006.  57 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 71 (2012); 
Van Swearingen, Imprisoning Rights: The Failure of Negotiated Governance in the Prison 
Inmate Grievance Process. 96 CAL. L. REV. 1353 (2008). 
13 (28 CFR 501- 501.3(a)). 
14 U.S. v. Warsame transcript of sentencing, 7/9/2009, on file with author. 
Forthcoming, 51 (1) Criminal Law Bulletin ___ (2014) 
5 
 
pretrial solitary confinement in terrorism cases.15  Other SAMs cases offer further clues that 
SAMs are being applied unthinkingly and without oversight, such as the imposition of SAMs on 
one defendant whose judge determined outright that he posed no immediate danger,16 or the 
statement by a prosecutor, when SAMs were questioned, that SAMs were, to his understanding 
“the way all material support defendants were held,” regardless of the specific allegations against 
those defendants.17  Because of this reflexive use, as well as the harsh nature of the confinement, 
SAMs are repeatedly cited as an example of the striking deviation from normal criminal 
procedure that, critics assert, characterizes the criminal justice system’s response to the threat of 
terrorism and the terrorist attacks of 2001.18  
 SAMs may indeed serve as an example of post-2001 responses to terrorism, but their 
explanatory power lies in their consistency with prior practices rather than their exceptionalism. 
While the claim that “9/11 changed everything” has seemed ubiquitous and axiomatic in recent 
years, this article joins those of a minority of scholars who have associated post-2001 tactics with 
                                                          
15 Kareem Fahim Restrictive Terms of Prisoner's Confinement Add Fuel to Debate” The New 
York Times February 5, 2009 pg. A27. 
16 U.S. v. Warsame transcript of sentencing, 7/9/2009, on file with author. 
17 U.S. v. Sadequee, transcript of proceedings, 3/3/2009 at 43, on file with author. 
18 Heena Musabji and Christina Abraham, The Threat to Civil Liberties and Its Effect on Muslims 
in America, 1 DEPAUL H. SOC. JUST. 83 (2007-2008); Susan Akram & Maritza Karmel, 
Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and 
Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction without a Difference? 38 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 609 (2004-2005); Sadiq Reza, Unpatriotic Acts: An Introduction, 48 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 
3 (2003-2004); Sam A. Schmidt and Joshua Dratel, Turning the Tables: Using the Government’s 
Secrecy and Security Arsenal for the Benefit of the Client in Terrorism Prosecutions, 48 N. Y. L. 
SCH. L. REV. 69 (2003-2004);  Joshua Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case: 
How Secrecy and Security Impair the Defense of a Terrorism Case, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & 
ETHICS J. 81 (2003-2004); J. Soffiyah Elijah, The Reality of Political Prisoners in the United 
States: What September 11 Taught Us About Defending Them, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L. J. 129 
(2002). 
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pre-2001 trends and efforts on the part of law enforcement agents.19  While these works examine 
counter-terror and criminal justice trends more broadly, this article is among the first to provide 
an in-depth study of the development of what has been identified as an example of post-2001 
counter-terror excess.    As this article will show, the use of SAMs did change as the judiciary 
abandoned oversight of government claims of dangerousness in order to allow the reflexive use 
of pretrial solitary confinement in the case of “dangerous” defendants, but this change was 
established prior to September 11, 2001.  Moreover, this sea change is better understood as 
another aspect of the increasing informalism and decreasing judicial oversight of the criminal 
justice system as a whole, rather than a response to a war-like threat.   
This article analyzes the increasingly reflexive use of SAMs in the late 20th century.  I 
begin with the origins of SAMs as a response to high level organized crime defendants more than 
a decade prior to the terror attacks of 2001, and follow the development of SAMs to its 
increasing use in terrorism-related cases at the turn of the 21st century, in order to demonstrate 
the conventional criminal justice roots of this 21st century counter-terror tactic.   
Rather than a response to terrorism, this article locates the creation and development of 
SAMs in conventional criminal justice developments that were ongoing, and well known, at the 
                                                          
19 Mary L. Dudziak. SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY: A WATERSHED MOMENT? (2003); John Hagan 
“Twin Towers, Iron Cages and the Culture of Control” in M. Matravers (ed.) MANAGING 
MODERNITY: POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2005); John Parry, Terrorism and the 
New Criminal Process.  15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765 (2007); Robert Chesney and Jack 
Goldsmith Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 
STANF.  L. REV. 1079 (2007); David Cole and James Dempsey, TERRORISM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY. (2006); 
James Forman Jr.  Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the War on 
Terror Possible 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331 (2009); Colin Dayan, THE STORY OF THE 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL (2007); Chesney, Robert. The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws 
and the Demands of Prevention. HARVARD JOURNAL ON LEGISLATION (2005). 
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turn of the 21st century.  Below I briefly outline the methodology I used to study SAMs, which 
are often hidden and may be difficult to uncover.  I then turn to key critiques of the criminal 
justice system made by scholars in the late 20th century.  I also discuss the place of supermax 
facilities and solitary confinement in this history of U.S. criminal justice in late modernity.  I 
then turn to SAMs.  In particular, I focus on two post- 2001 cases which exemplify the critiques 
of SAMs and the ways in which SAMs are believed to avoid traditional criminal justice 
protections.  I then look to the history and development of SAMs practice, and find that these 
traditional protections were long gone in SAMs practice prior to 2001.  Moreover, their gradual 
diminishment is linked to the broader criminal justice developments that have been noted by 
scholars for several decades.  I conclude that SAMs are more closely linked to late 20th century 
criminal justice practices than to early 21st century responses to terrorism, and I suggest that this 
may be true for many other supposed “changes” in response to the terror attacks of 2001.   
Researching SAMs 
As with many aspects of the response to terrorism in the 21st century, analysis of SAMs 
policy is fraught with difficulty because of its hidden nature.  The practice of SAMs has been 
shrouded in secrecy, making it very difficult to know precisely how the practice works or has 
worked over time.  The Department of Justice has acknowledged that 46 federal prisoners are 
being held under SAMs, of which 26 are charged in association with terrorism and 28 are held in 
the Supermax facility in Florence, Colorado,20 but it has refused to disclose the names of the 
prisoners who are or have been so held.  Moreover, this number changes seemingly constantly, 
                                                          
20  See Basil Katz, “After 18 years, terrorist seeks reason for special detention.”  Thompson 
Reuters, July 1, 2011.  Available at 
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/06_-
_June/After_16_years,_terrorist_seeks_reason_for_special_detention/ .   
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both as new defendants are arrested and as defendants are moved out of SAMs and into other 
forms of confinement (generally into other forms of confinement where communication is still 
limited but some time spent outside of isolation is allowed). 21  The lack of names creates severe 
difficulties in researching SAMs, as does the fact that SAMs normally include restrictions on 
communications of lawyers and visitors to SAMs prisoners.  This means that even family 
members of prisoners may not be allowed to discuss the conditions under which SAMs prisoners 
are being held.  Motions and rulings concerning SAMs are often sealed, as are transcripts.   
This article relies on the legal challenges, judicial opinions, and media reports that have 
escaped this secrecy.  By searching through legal filings and news stories for telltale words such 
as SHU (special housing unit), solitary, lockdown, and various specific conditions of 
confinement associated with SAMs as my research revealed those conditions, I was able to 
identify several dozen SAMs convicts and defendants.  The arguments and rulings in these cases 
tell the story of the development of SAMs.  They identify SAMs not as an overreaction to 
terrorism, but as part of the broader overreaction to crime in general that characterized the late 
20th century.  
I rely on the motions of attorneys and opinions of judges to gauge the accepted practices 
of the federal criminal courts.  In so doing, I do not assume that judges, prosecutors, or defense 
                                                          
21 In 2009, the Department of Justice acknowledged that (at that time) 44 prisoners federal were 
being held under SAMs, of which 29 were charged in association with terrorism (Department of 
Justice Fact Sheet, June 9, 2009, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag-
564.html  .)   In February of 2009, a Department of Justice spokesperson stated that there were 
46 such inmates, 30 of which were associated with terrorism.  Six of those prisoners, four of 
whom were terrorism-associated, had not yet been convicted of the crimes with which they were 
charged.  Kareem Fahim, Restrictive Terms of Prisoners’ Confinement Add Fuel to Debate, 
supra note 15.  Attorney General Eric Holder has described the movement between more and less 
harsh versions of communication management isolation in his motion for summary judgement in 
the case of Ayyad v. Holder (filed March 25, 2011). 
Forthcoming, 51 (1) Criminal Law Bulletin ___ (2014) 
9 
 
attorneys are either honest or straightforward regarding the reasons for their actions.  Rather, I 
assume that their actions give some insight to what they believe will work in the criminal justice 
system.  In other words, prosecutors put forward that information that they believe will be 
deemed sufficient to achieve the result they want, i.e. the imposition of SAMs, while defense 
attorneys put forward those arguments which they believe will give their clients the best chance 
of removal from SAMs, and judges’ formal opinions give the amount of information they believe 
necessary in order to make their decision legitimate in the eyes of observers, most importantly 
higher level (appellate) judges.  These arguments and opinions, then, give insight into the way in 
which participants in the criminal justice system perceive the requirements, norms, and values of 
that system.  Perhaps more importantly, in the case of the criminal justice system, these 
arguments constitute the system itself, as the acceptance of norms and priorities, represented in 
judicial opinions, becomes precedent and therefore law in future cases. 
In this way, I analyzed the development of SAMs practice, from a new and mistrusted 
technique of preventive detention, to an accepted and even assumed practice.  I looked for the 
key moments and characteristics of this development in order to determine whether this practice 
belongs in the category of late modern criminal justice, or post-2001 counter-terror 
exceptionalism.  My findings suggest that SAMs fit quite well in the former grouping.   
But SAMs are not merely a form of confinement in the federal criminal justice system, 
entirely removed from more extreme tactics that characterize the U.S. government’s response to 
terrorism since 2001.  SAMs are a microcosm of the values and priorities that characterize the 
post 2001 response to terrorism.  They allow harsh treatment of persons who have not been 
convicted of any crime, and they are applied, seemingly, with no check on executive claims or 
authority.  They represent the valuing of public safety over any other rights or interests, even 
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where the alleged threat to public safety consists of a claimed (but unproven) association rather 
than any proven activity or intent.  In short, the criticisms of SAMs are the criticisms of post-
2001 counter-terror practices.   
For this reason, SAMs present an excellent case study in the evolution of counter-terror 
policies, and as a case study they suggest that the supposed exceptionalism of post-2001 U.S. 
policies has been vastly overrated.  Instead, this article suggests, the harsh and unchecked 
counter-terror tactics of the U.S. government post-2001 originated in the harsh and unchecked 
crime control tactics of the U.S. government in the late 20th century. 
Background 
Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, scholars, activists, and government defenders have 
chronicled the entrance of the U.S. government into a state of exception.  Authors have debated 
the necessity of the countless changes that followed 2001, arguing over should, or could, have 
been avoided.  Whether or not civil liberties can withstand warlike attacks, how the rule of law 
should respond to an extreme threat, and whether or not the U.S. government’s exceptional 
response can be justified, have become favorite topics for scholars of all disciplines. Changes 
believed to have been brought about by this one horrendous attack have run the gamut, from 
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torture torture22 to torts,23 from securities regulation24 to surveillance and civil liberties,25 from 
the nature of war26 to the nature of racism.27 
The breadth of changes linked to the 2001 attacks makes it difficult to generalize, yet 
some overarching trends are clearly present.  Most apparent is the critique of “ever-expanding 
justifications for the assertion of executive and unilateral power.”28 According to this critique, 
the U.S. government has acquired the power to infringe on the lives and liberties of persons who 
would have been safe from government intrusion prior to the 2001 attacks, either through 
strategic use of those attacks or through genuine efforts to protect the public.  Whether by relying 
on “guilt by association,”29 or justifying actions as efforts to prevent and preempt terrorist 
attacks,30 the fundamental change in everything since 2001 is, these authors claim, the ability of 
the government to unilaterally act without checks or oversight.   
But to what extent did these checks exist prior to 2001?  As Kim Lane Scheppele notes, 
many of the post-2001 changes in policy, even those she herself highlights, were simply 
                                                          
22 See, e.g., Hajjar, Lisa.  Does Torture Work? A Sociolegal Assessment of the Practice in 
Historical and Global Perspective, ANNUAL REV. OF L. AND SOC. SCIENCE (2009). 
23 George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-Tort World?, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 175, 
188 (2007) 
24 Mary L. Schapiro, The Regulation of the Securities Industry in the Wake of the 9/11 Tragedy, 7 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5 (2001). 
25 Matthew J. Morgan, ed., THE LEGAL IMPACT OF 9/11 AND THE NEW LEGAL LANDSCAPE: THE 
DAY THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING? (2009). 
26 James Wirtz and James A. Russell, U.S. Policy on Preventive War and Preemption. THE 
NONPROLIFERATION REV. 113-123 (Spring 2003). 
27 Thomas Ross, Whiteness After 9/11, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 223, 225 (2005) 
28 Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations 
of 9/11.  6 U. PENN. J. OF CON. L. 1001 (2004). 
29 David Cole The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War in Terrorism. 38 HARV. 
CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REV. 1 (2003); Robert Chesney, Civil Liberties and the 
Terrorism Prevention Paradigm: The Guilt by Association Critique, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1409 
(2003). 
30 Chesney, Id.; Wirtz and Russell, supra note 26. 
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codifications of pre-2001 practices that had already gained judicial approval, while others were 
changes to internal checks and policies, rather than avoidance of external oversight.  Similarly, 
the “guilt by association” critique is one that preceded the 2001 attacks.31  Even the use of 
rendition, the process by which terrorist detainees were transferred to black sites in order to be 
tortured into providing information, began in 1996 when suspects were rendered to countries 
with questionable human rights records in order to be questioned.32  
Reaching beyond specific policies, the overarching trend of decreasing checks on the 
executive branch and increasing avenues for unilateral executive action is one that has been well 
established by punishment scholars over the past several decades.  Just as in the terrorism 
context, these decreasing checks are justified by the prioritization of prevention and public 
safety.  In perhaps the most cited work on modern criminal justice, David Garland describes a 
cultural crisis based on a perpetual sense of disorder and confusion.  He describes a perpetual 
fear that leads to a desperate desire for the state to protect the public.  At the same time, modern 
criminological theories viewing crime as rational and opportunistic, and viewing rehabilitation as 
impossible or undesireable,33 lead to a focus on prevention. Concerns for the rights of offenders 
steadily decrease in the face of an overly emotional public that refuses to identify with 
criminals.34   
The abandonment of the criminal other and prioritization of prevention is evident in the 
public’s uncaring response to the government’s practice of punishing without proving guilt.  
                                                          
31 Cole, supra note 29. 
32 Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's 'Extraordinary Rendition' 
Program. THE NEW YORKER, February 8, 2005, p. 106.  
33 Andrew Von Hirsch. DOING JUSTICE. (1976). 
34 David Garland, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001) 
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Community based policing, workplace drug testing, increased police presence, as well as 
increased stops, frisks and arrests, all clearly prior to any determination of guilt, create a new 
form of punishment, avoiding oversight by functioning as administrative “management of 
dangerous populations” rather than a new form of criminal justice.35   
Much like the terrorism context, the increasing desire for preventive interventions results 
in the use of “end runs”36 or “short cuts”37 around the criminal justice system and its required 
procedural protections.  These alternate paths to detention, such as the use of immigration 
detention and civil commitment for sex offenders, allow the government to bypass judicial 
checks by turning to an administrative forum where oversight is less rigorous.  These practices 
are unremarked upon as a necessary aspect of the preventive regime, supported by public and 
government backlash against stringent due process protections enacted in the 1960s and 70s 
which lessened the preventive and efficient processing of criminal justice.38   
However, the desire for efficient processing of criminals reaches even into the criminal 
courts, the supposed bastion of procedural checks, as loitering statutes and other responses to 
gang violence allow for incarceration based on guilt by association, increased preventive 
                                                          
35 Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of 
Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOL. 449 (1992); Jonathan Simon GOVERNING 
THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND 
CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); Bernard Harcourt, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, 
POLICING AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007). 
36 Katherine Beckett and Naomi Murakawa, Mapping the Shadow Carceral State: Toward an 
Institutionally Capacious Approach to Punishment.  THEORETICAL CRIMINOL. 1 (2012). 
37 Nicola Lacey The Resurgence of Character: Criminal Responsibility in the Context of 
Criminalisation. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIM.L L.  151 (2011). 
38 Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, Defending the criminal law: Reflections on the changing 
character of crime, procedure, and sanctions. CRIM. L. AND PHILOSOPHY 21 (2007). 
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intervention, and detention with decreased checks.39  In more traditional criminal prosecutions, 
criminal courts turn towards efficient processing of defendants who are presumed to be guilty, 
which requires increasing informalism and decreasing checks on the executive (once provided by 
traditional due process protections).40 
In other words, late modern criminal justice was well on its way to finding opportunities 
for unilateral executive action in the interests of public safety, long before the terror attacks of 
2001. This has been noted by some few scholars who have discussed the predecessors of post-
2001 counter-terror.41  Parry42 Foreman,43 and Dayan44 all relate the use of torture to the harsh 
nature of pre-2001 criminal justice practices.  Dayan specifically examines the jurisprudence of 
the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment as a predecessor for acceptance of 
the use of torture, while Parry and Foreman more broadly look to Garland’s “Culture of Control” 
and the general punitiveness of crime control in late modernity without specifically following 
any one doctrine.  Cole and Dempsey, and Chesney and Goldsmith generally acknowledge the 
beginnings of the use of deportation to avoid criminal justice and increased resemblance between 
                                                          
39 Carole Steiker, The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 771 (1998); 
Paul Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (2001). 
40 Wolfgang Heydebrand and Carroll Seron. RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1990); William Stuntz, Law and Grace, 98 VA. L. REV. 367 
(2012). 
41 See not 18, supra. 
42 John Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process.  15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765 
(2007). 
43 James Forman Jr.,   Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the War on 
Terror Possible 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331 (2009). 
44 Colin Dayan, THE STORY OF THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL (2007). 
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military and civilian justice systems prior to 2001, respectively, but focus instead on the increase 
in those trends since 2001.45   
Yet the brief literature review above suggests that late modern criminal justice may bear 
far more responsibility for our 21st century counter-terror policies than has been acknowledged 
thus far.  While an exhaustive examination of post-2001 policies is beyond the scope of any 
single article, this article begins the process of examining the origins of 21st Century counter-
terror practices without assuming that these practices began in the 21st Century.  This article 
looks to the use of SAMs as a starting point for this discussion. 
As noted above, SAMs have been continually recognized as a central aspect of the 
supposed changes to the U.S. criminal justice system since 2001.  They are an exceptionally 
harsh form of punishment, arguably the harshest form of confinement used in the U.S. today.  
Moreover, the ADMAX facilities they employ were a model for “one of the worst solitary 
confinement facilities at Guantanamo.”46 They have been used as precedent by government 
actors seeking to justify the continuing impositions on attorney client privilege and pretrial 
research experienced by detainees and their counsel at Guantanamo.47   
                                                          
45Cole, David, and James Dempsey, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2006); Chesney, Robert, and Jack Goldsmith. 
Terrorism and the convergence of criminal and military detention models. 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1079 (2007). 
46 Vincent Warren, "Shut Down the Whole Thing." NEW YORK TIMES.COM, ROOM FOR DEBATE, 
May 1: Available at http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/11/18/should-obama-close-
guantanamo-and-end-military-tribunals/close-guantanamo-and-shut-down-the-commissions; 
Jeffrey Ian Ross and Dawn L. Rothe, "Guantanamo: America's Foreign Supermax in the Fight 
Against Terror." In THE GLOBALIZATION OF SUPERMAX PRISONS, Jeffrey Ian Ross (ed.), 145-159.  
47D.B. Woods, "Memorandum from Rear Admiral D.B. Woods re: Order Governing Written 
Communications Management for Detainees Involved in Military Commissions." December, 
2011. 
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Additionally, SAMs represent an apex in criminal justice end-runs around the 
burdensome requirements of criminal procedure.  SAMs consistently interfere with defendants’ 
trial preparation.  Non-contact visits combine with limitations on reading materials to inhibit 
defendants from looking at trial materials with their attorneys, as the barrier between defendant 
and attorney results in only one person having the material at a time.  Restrictions on media that 
defendants can see may lead to relevant information being missed.  Moreover, attorneys 
complain that the psychological deterioration that accompanies solitary confinement leads to an 
inability of defendants to focus on the material issues in their cases.  All of this undermines the 
ability of defendants to engage in defending themselves, thereby lessening the adversarial 
character of the (supposed) looming trial.48  Worse, defendants suffering from desperation in the 
face of continued solitary confinement are likely to plead guilty, simply to shorten their stay in 
solitary confinement.  In this way, SAMs may well coerce defendants into pleading guilty.49  
Altogether, SAMs severely undermine the ultimate adversarial check on executive action – the 
adversarial criminal trial. 
But most importantly, the imposition of this exceedingly harsh detention on defendants 
such as Hashmi, with no apparent demonstration of necessity for their imposition, shows the lack 
of oversight and the extent of unilateral executive reach that is the hallmark of post-2001 
counter-terror tactics. The harsh nature of SAMs, the difficulties they create for trial preparation, 
and the pressure the apply to defendants to plead guilty all clearly accompany any use of pretrial 
supermaximum security solitary confinement, which preceded 2001 and was used in high level 
                                                          
48Sam A. Schmidt and Joshua Dratel, Turning the Tables: Using the Government’s Secrecy and 
Security Arsenal for the Benefit of the Client in Terrorism Prosecutions, 48 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 
69 (2003-2004). 
49 Schmidt and Dratel, Id., see also Brennan Center, 2008, supra note 1. 
Forthcoming, 51 (1) Criminal Law Bulletin ___ (2014) 
17 
 
organized crime cases.  The question is, is the reflexive application of SAMs truly a change in 
response to the terror attacks of 2001?    
 The answer is, no.  As the following sections will show, SAMs must be examined in light 
of the transition to a punitive and yet administrative, preventive, risk-averse, and therefore 
deferential criminal justice system.  SAMs belong in this late modern criminal justice system, 
both historically and ideologically.   This suggests that we may find criminal justice roots for 
other aspects of the response to terrorism in the 21st Century.   
 The following sections describe the development of SAMs.  
The Birth of SAMs 
 Although it appears to have been generally forgotten, 50 the use of pretrial solitary 
confinement to control a dangerous defendant predates both the codification of SAMs and the 
modern concern with terror defendants.  In 1988, Bureau of Prisons regulations already allowed 
for the use of solitary in the form of administrative detention, including “when the inmate's 
continued presence in the general population poses a serious threat to life, property, self, staff, 
other inmates or to the security or orderly running of the institution and when the inmate… [i]s 
                                                          
50 Those few scholars who have examined SAMs have discussed them either as an overreaction 
to the terrorist attacks of 2001, or have not looked past the regulation passed in 1996.  Heena 
Musabji and Christina Abraham, The Threat to Civil Liberties and Its Effect on Muslims in 
America, 1 DEPAUL H. SOC. JUST. 83 (2007-2008); Susan Akram & Maritza Karmel, 
Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and 
Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction without a Difference? 38 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 609 (2004-2005); Sadiq Reza, Unpatriotic Acts: An Introduction, 48 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 
3 (2003-2004); Sam A. Schmidt and Joshua Dratel, supra note 28;  Joshua Dratel, Ethical Issues 
in Defending a Terrorism Case, supra note 18; J. Soffiyah Elijah, The Reality of Political 
Prisoners in the United States: What September 11 Taught Us About Defending Them, 18 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER L. J. 129 (2002). 
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pending investigation or trial for a criminal act.” 51  The regulation was unquestionably in use by 
1991, when John Gotti and his codefendants, successfully challenged their 23 hour per day 
solitary confinement as they awaited trial on charges that included witness tampering, multiple 
murders, solicitation and conspiracy to commit murder.52  El-Sayyid Nosair, a primary defendant 
in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing prosecution, was held in administrative detention after 
his indictment in that case; his challenge to the conditions of his confinement was unsuccessful.53  
 Defendants in the above cases had been given, and made use of, the due process 
procedures required by 28 C.F.R. 541 (governing administrative solitary confinement); namely 
notice of reasons for detention within 24 hours, a hearing if detention lasts greater than seven 
days, and periodic reviews thereafter.54 Use of the regulation, however, was not strictly 
necessary in order to house a defendant in solitary confinement pending trial.  Augusto Falcone 
was transferred to USP Marion, a maximum security facility, while awaiting trial for his 
activities “as a drug ‘Kingpin’” for importing 75 kilos of cocaine into the United States and 
operating a criminal enterprise.55  His 1994 challenge to his solitary confinement was 
unsuccessful in part due of the judge’s determination that Falcone was not being held in 
administrative solitary; Falcone had merely been transferred to a facility where “[a]ll inmates… 
are housed in single-man cells, and most are restricted to their cells for 23 hours per day.”56 
                                                          
51 18 C.F.R. 541.22; 53 Fed. Reg. 196 January 5, 1988. 
52 United States v. Gotti, 755 F. Supp. 1159, 1164-5 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).   
53 United States v. Nosair, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12159 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).  Although Nosair was 
awaiting trial, his detention might not appropriately be thought of as pretrial detention; he had 
already been convicted of murder.  Id.  at 1.  
54 28 C.F.R. 541.22(b), (c); 53 Fed. Reg 196, January 5, 1988.  In the Gotti case, it was in part 
the failure to adequately give notice of the reasons for administrative detention that apparently 
led to the judge’s decision.  755 F. Supp. 1159, 1161. 
55 Falcone v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 852 F. Supp. 1413, 1415 (S.D.Ill. 1994). 
56 Id. at 1416. 
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 SAMs as such were officially introduced to the BOP in October of 1995, in the form of 
an interim rule allowing for “special administrative measures that are reasonably necessary to 
prevent disclosure of classified information…  include placing the inmate in administrative 
detention and/or limiting certain privileges, including, but not limited to, correspondence, 
visiting, and use of telephone.”57  This somewhat vague rule, specifically limited to national 
security cases and the threat of divulging classified information, went into effect immediately,58 
received no public comment and was eventually codified in 1997.59   
It was the second half of the SAMs rule that received the most publicity and response, 
leading most authors to date SAMs as originating in 1996.60  In May of 1996 a regulation 
allowing for the implementation of “special administrative procedures that are reasonably 
necessary to protect persons against the risk of death or serious bodily injury” were first codified 
as an interim rule with request for comments.61  The rule was effective immediately.62  
Allowable restrictions to be placed on inmates were almost identical to those suggested in 1995 
regarding classified information, with the addition of an explicit reference to limitations on 
“interviews with representatives of the news media.”63   
 As an administrative regulation, and (as will be discussed in the following section) as was 
the case with all administrative solitary confinement, the practice had little judicial oversight to 
                                                          
57 60 FR 53490, October 13, 1995.  28 CFR 501. 
58 Id. 
59 62 FR 33730, June 20, 1997.  28 CFR 501. 
60 See, e.g., Joshua Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case, supra note 18; Heena 
Musabji and Christina Abraham, Threat to Civil Liberties and Muslims in America, supra note 
18; Kareem Fahim, Restrictive Terms of Prisoners’ Confinement Add Fuel to Debate, supra note 
15. 
61 61 FR 25120, May 17, 1996.  28 CFR 501.3(a).   
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
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begin with.  Administrative actions are generally subjected to more deferential judicial review, 
and this is even more the case where prison regulations are concerned.64  The decision to place 
an inmate under SAMs was (and still is) to be made initially by the Attorney General with no 
non-executive oversight whatsoever.  SAMs were to be  
implemented upon written notification to the Director, Bureau of Prisons, by the 
Attorney General or, at the Attorney General's direction, by the head of a federal 
law enforcement agency, or the head of a member agency of the United States 
intelligence community, that there is a substantial risk that a prisoner's 
communications or contacts with persons could result in death or serious bodily 
injury to persons, or substantial damage to property that would entail the risk of 
death or serious bodily injury to persons.65 
 The limitations implemented in accordance with SAMs were to be allowed in 120 day 
increments, renewable upon “additional written notification” from the same designated persons 
“that the circumstances identified in the original notification continue to exist.”66  All of this left 
the imposition of SAMs completely in the hands of the executive branch, with a hypothetical67 
path of review via the Administrative Remedy Program68 and further review by the judiciary 
                                                          
64 See Haney, supra note 10;Reiter, supra note 12; Swearingen, supra note 12. 
65 61 FR 25120, May 17, 1996.  28 CFR 501.3(a). 
66 61 FR 25120, May 17, 1996.  28 CFR 501.3(c). 
67 The actual existence of an administrative remedy was first questioned in Yousef v. Reno, 254 
F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2001), decided in July of 2001 (prior to the terrorist attacks on September 
11th).  See notes 115-117, infra, and accompanying text.   
68 28 CFR part 542 
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after all administrative options had been exhausted.69  The hearing provided in earlier 
administrative detention regulations was noticeably absent.70 
 Judges overseeing SAMs cases immediately acknowledged that these limitations 
amounted to solitary confinement, and that they applied to all persons in the custody of the 
Bureau of Prisons, including defendants awaiting trial.71  Early cases mentioning SAMs 
described the conditions under which the prisoner was being held as “confined in special 
housing, i.e., solitary confinement;”72 a second described the unit in which the prisoner was held 
by stating “prisoners are kept essentially in solitary confinement;”73 a third noted that the 
defendant (who was not yet convicted) “was subject to solitary confinement for the first 15 
months of his detention,”74 a fourth described the prisoner’s placement “into administrative 
segregation in an isolated soundproof cell.”75  Each of these cases predated the attacks of 2001. 
 Following the September 11th attacks, the regulation was almost immediately modified in 
the form of an interim rule, however the modifications were, in practice, fairly limited, with one 
exception.  The new interim rule allowed for the monitoring of attorney-client conversations.76  
                                                          
6961 FR 25120, May 17, 1996.  28 CFR 501.3(d). 
70 See comments to 1996 interim rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 33730 (commenter refers to ‘placing a 
prisoner in segregation without a due process hearing.’) (June 20, 1997). 
71 In spite of the fact that the list of subjects for the regulation reads, in its entirety, “prisoners.”  
61 FR 25120, May 17, 1996. 
72 U.S. v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101, 107 (2nd Cir. 1998).   
73 U.S. v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 2000).   
74 U.S. v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74, 78 (2nd Cir. 2000) 
75 Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d at 1214. 
76 66 FR 55066, October 31, 2001; 28 CFR 501.3(d).   
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While this led to substantial criticism, the option to monitor attorney-client conversations does 
not appear to have ever been used.77 
 Several additional, but perhaps less notable modifications were included as well.  The 
regulation was amended to allow for an initial detention of up to one year before the 
dangerousness of a prisoner had to be reevaluated.78  Certainly, it is possible that this had a 
substantive effect on inmates held under SAMs, however in practice it appears unlikely.  Wadih 
El-Hage, for instance, who was held prior to the modification, received a modification to his 
SAMs whereby he was no longer held in pure solitary confinement after 15 months—which 
would not appear to be in conjunction with a 120 day review period.79  Later defendants awaiting 
trial remained under SAMs for years at a time, through numerous review periods, at times having 
their SAMs removed and then reinstated arguably unnecessarily.80 
 Additionally, while the listed subject of the regulation remained “prisoners,”81 a 
definition of “inmate” was added in order to make clear that the regulation reached both persons 
charged and persons convicted.82  Finally, a section was added making clear that the Bureau of 
Prisons need not have custody of the individual, other agencies holding prisoners of the 
Department of Justice (for instance, U.S. Marshalls) might implement similar conditions of 
                                                          
77 Letter from Samuel Seymour, President, New York City Bar Association (Feb. 16, 2012) (on 
file with author). 
78 66 FR 55065-6 October 31, 2001, 28 CFR 501.2(c); 28 CFR 501.3(c) (the modification carried 
through both for risk of disclosure of classified information and for risk of dangerousness to the 
prison or society in general). 
79 U.S. v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 78. 
80 See, e.g., U.S. v. Warsame, notes 117-120 infra, and accompanying text. 
81 66 FR 55065.  
82 66 FR 55065, 28 CFR 500.1(c).  This in spite of the fact that there did not seem to be argument 
regarding this issue.  See notes 71-75, supra, and accompanying text. 
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detention.83  These regulations remained in the form of an interim rule until their final 
codification in 2007.84  At that point, commentary accompanying the final rule made clear that 
renewing SAMs “should not require a de novo review, but only a determination that there is a 
continuing need for the imposition of special administrative measures in light of the 
circumstances.”85 
Comments on the interim rule specifically requested a description of the administrative 
procedures by which an inmate could challenge his or her SAMs.86  This request was denied, and 
inmates were directed to the Administrative Remedy Program already in place.87  The 
requirement to exhaust administrative remedies remained a bone of contention in almost every 
SAMs challenge that was brought to court.88 Of course, while defendants worked their way 
through the administrative process, they remained in solitary confinement with SAMs in place. 
                                                          
83 66 FR 55064, 55066, 28 CFR 501.3(f). 
84 72 FR 16271, April 4, 2007. 
85 72 FR 16271, 16272.  
86 72 FR 16274. 
87 Id. 
88 Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2nd Cir. 
2003); United States v. Reid 369, F.3d 619 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 
(4th Cir. 2008); Al-Owhali v. Ashcroft, 279 F.Supp.2d 13 (D.D.C. 2003); United States v. 
Elzahabi No. 04-282 (D. Minn) ORDER of December 7, 2005, available at 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11004938886914500817&q=el+zahabi+december
+2005&hl=en&as_sdt=2,33; United States. v. Sattar, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79328, October 27, 
2006 (stating that the defendant had exhausted administrative remedies regarding SAMs in the 
abstract, but not as to any particular restriction). 
 In 2008, two separate district courts found that the exhaustion requirement did not apply 
to motions “brought to court in the context of an already-pending action” as opposed to new 
actions.  U.S. v. Hashmi, 621 F.Supp.2d 76, 85-6 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Ayyad v. Gonzales, D.D.C. 
No. 05-cv-02342, Order of July 31, 2008.  This was based on an analysis of the legislative intent 
behind the Prison Litigation Reform Act , 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a) (from which the exhaustion 
requirement stems), which they found to be one of lessening the financial burden on courts.  The 
relatively inexpensive nature of a new motion in an already existing action, as opposed to the 
creation of an entirely new case and claim, led these courts to the conclusion that the exhaustion 
requirement did not apply. 
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While the above has outlined the creation and amendment of SAMs regulations, the 
existence of pretrial solitary confinement of dangerous defendants prior to the implementation of 
SAMs regulations suggests that the use of administrative supermaximum security solitary 
confinement [ADMAX] should inform any analysis of SAMs.  Indeed, the increasing use of 
ADMAX facilities aligns quite well, chronologically, with the creation and transformation of 
SAMs.  Accordingly, the following section offers a brief overview of the history of ADMAX. 
Setting the stage for SAMs—the ADMAX explosion 
 It will come as no surprise to practitioners, or to students and scholars of contemporary 
technologies of punishment, that SAMs appeared during the 1980s and 90s, as the flourishing 
use of ADMAX facilities was well underway during this period.  But the tendency to date 
practices used in connection with terrorism cases from either 2001 or 1996 suggests a need to 
recollect the history of ADMAX.  In fact, it is generally the use of ADMAX facilities and 
practices that are authorized as SAMs—SAMs practice is ADMAX practice, SAMs challenges 
are ADMAX challenges, and SAMs law is ADMAX law. 
 While states began building ADMAX facilities in the 1980s, Keramet Reiter and Craig 
Haney have connected their origins to the criminal justice developments of the late 1960s and 
70s.89  According to Reiter, the creation and preservation of ADMAX facilities may be directly 
linked to federal prisoners’ rights litigation in these decades.  As courts specified necessary 
protections for prisoners, prison administrators responded by addressing the letter, rather than 
spirit of these requirements.  Administrators responded to courts’ admonishments regarding 
prison conditions by building new, pristine, technologically advanced cells that could not be 
                                                          
89 Reiter, supra note 12; Haney, supra note 10. 
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criticized in this manner.  Advancing technologies allowed prison administrators to address the 
need for out of cell time, medical intervention, and similar tangible needs without increasing 
actual human contact, or in fact while decreasing that contact.  By the time prisoners’ litigation 
could respond to these developments, the rehabilitative ideal had disappeared from prisons, 
replaced by a steadily increasing willingness of judges to defer to the administrative 
determinations of prison officials, particularly regarding prison safety.90  Moreover, prison 
administrators were able to respond to challenges that they were abiding by every letter of 
courts’ prior rulings,91 and that their own grievance procedures (a form of “cosmetic 
compliance” with former rights-protective court rulings) should be relied on in order to rectify 
any remaining problems92. 
 Haney turns directly to the abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal, and the advancing 
tendency to view crime and criminals as a problem to be managed rather than resolved.  This 
general criminal justice trend was compounded due to the steadily increasing prison population, 
which caused massive overcrowding, in turn causing disciplinary complications.  ADMAX 
facilities enabled the management of this increasing population, arguably unnecessarily, while 
providing some level of ammunition to politicians looking to court voters by appearing “tough 
on crime.” (Haney, 2003) 
 In other words, ADMAX may be seen as an outgrowth of the deferential posture 
accorded to criminal justice officials by the judiciary, originating in a public-safety oriented 
criminal justice system and political body that had turned away from prisoners’ rights in favor of 
                                                          
90Reiter, supra note 12.; Van Swearingen, supra note 12. 
91 Reiter, supra note 12. 
92 Swearingen, supra note 12. 
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prevention and management of criminal activity.  In the case of ADMAX, this originated with 
the public safety rhetoric of the 1980s, and “flourished” in the 1990s.93  By 1991, when Gotti 
lodged his successful challenge to his ADMAX housing, the ADMAX boom was well underway.  
“Super maximum security” prison facilities existed or were being built in more than half the 
states in the country.94  Courts were steadily accepting these facilities, due to the meticulousness 
of their creation and the generally increasing deference that judges were willing to accord prison 
administrators.   
In this context, the creation and acceptance of SAMs hardly seems surprising.  Yet SAMs 
still may be seen as a step further than ADMAX, at least when imposed prior to trial.  The 
following section discusses the evolution of pretrial SAMs, from a rarely imposed and carefully 
overseen exception, to the reflexive practice which it is today. 
 
SAMS: From rare to reflexive 
Scholars looking at SAMs typically date their origin at 1996,95 when the phrase “special 
administrative measures” was first used in a BOP regulation.  To better contextualize SAMs 
practice, however, we must remember that the first regulation allowing for administrative pretrial 
solitary confinement was passed in 1988,96 only one year after pretrial detention based on a 
defendant’s dangerousness was determined to be constitutional by the Supreme Court.  Under 
                                                          
93 Haney, supra note 10. 
94 Human Rights Watch, Prison Conditions in the United States: A Human Rights Watch Report 
(1991). 
95 See, e.g., Joshua Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case, supra note 9; Heena 
Musabji and Christina Abraham, supra note 9. 
96 18 C.F.R. 541.22; 53 Fed. Reg. 196 January 5, 1988. 
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this regulation, defendants were given due process in the form of administrative checks, 
including periodic reviews and a hearing if solitary confinement was to last longer than one 
week.97  Perhaps more importantly, however, judges ruling on the acceptability of pretrial 
solitary confinement seemed to judge the regulation as a second form of preventive detention, 
and kept close watch on the justifications for the use of this extraordinary practice. 
One example of this careful judicial oversight is that of John Gotti, who was held in pretrial 
solitary confinement based on his alleged activities as the boss of the Gambino crime family.98  
Although he was charged with several violent felonies including witness tampering, the judge in 
his case found that unless some showing could be made that he was going to continue offending 
from his prison cell, he could not be held in solitary confinement.99  The determination that the 
charges against him were serious enough to warrant preventive detention did not necessarily lead 
to a conclusion that preventive detention in solitary was called for, in spite of the fact that the 
allegations against him suggested that he might continue to be a danger even while incarcerated. 
A second example would be the case of Ahmad Suleiman.  Suleiman was indicted in 
association with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.100   Although he was only indicted for 
perjury,101 allegations brought by the U.S. Attorney’s office painted a portrait of a violent 
terrorist with the capability to do extreme damage.  Prosecutors on Suleiman’s case claimed that 
his fingerprints had been found on bomb manuals, and that he had been present in two separate 
militant training areas; he had also travelled in the company of one of the men accused of the 
                                                          
97 28 C.F.R. 541.22(b), (c); 53 Fed. Reg 196, January 5, 1988.   
98 United States v. Gotti, 755 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). 
99 Id. at 1165. 
100 United States v. Suleiman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4647, 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
101 Id. 
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World Trade Center bombing.102  While the judge acknowledged that Suleiman could be a 
danger if released into the general population, he maintained that this did not mean that it was 
likely that Suleiman would cause harm from jail.103  Suleiman was therefore ordered released 
from administrative detention and returned to the general population.104 
Cases where pretrial solitary confinement was allowed show the type of evidence that judges 
were looking for in these early days.  El Sayyid Nosair was held in pretrial solitary confinement 
based on allegations that the 1993 World Trade Center bombing had been in part an effort to 
help Nosair escape prison, and that an escape plan had been in place, of which Nosair had been 
aware.105  Luis Felipe, the defendant to whom most authors attribute the first SAMs case,106 was 
held in pretrial solitary confinement upon evidence that while in prison he had founded the Latin 
Kings and directed three successful murders, three attempted murders, and a separate murder 
conspiracy.107   
Comparing cases where solitary confinement was imposed to those where it was removed 
shows that while administrative solitary confinement was created to be preventive, in these early 
years it was a carefully monitored and limited practice, permitted only in cases where 
dangerousness was well established and violence seemed extremely likely.  Over the years 
following, however, and after the creation of SAMs, pretrial solitary confinement became more 
broadly preventive.  SAMs were allowed where defendants seemed capable of dangerous acts 
but no evidence was provided that they were likely to engage in them.  The point at which this 
                                                          
102 United States v. Suleiman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5793, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).   
103 Id. at 4. 
104 Id. at 6. 
105 United States v. Nosair, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12159 at 1-2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
106 U.S. v. Felipe, supra note 46. 
107 United States v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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extreme intervention was allowable moved earlier and earlier, and further and further from actual 
violence.  Judges steadily removed themselves from the process, leaving oversight of the use of 
SAMs to seemingly nonexistent BOP reviews. 
Following the trend: Judges abandon oversight of SAMs 
 Not only do SAMs predate the 2001 terror attacks, the decision by judges to abdicate any 
role they once had in overseeing SAMs application predates those attacks as well.  The primary 
case showing this abandonment is that of Wadih El Hage. 
  Wadih El Hage was indicted for perjury, but later charged with being part of the 
conspiracy to bomb U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998; his involvement was primarily as financier 
for al Qaeda.108  El Hage challenged his detention on the basis that there was no evidence that he 
had ever been directly involved in violence, let alone that he was capable of violence from jail, 
and that his detention in solitary confinement had been so long as to become punitive.109  While 
the Circuit Court appeared convinced of El Hage’s involvement in violent terrorist acts,110 the 
district court had already found that there was no danger of El Hage returning to violent 
conspiracies if released into the general population because he had no capability to do so.111   
 The Second Circuit did not challenge the district court’s analysis of El Hage’s 
dangerousness.  In fact, the Circuit court did not discuss El Hage’s dangerousness at all.  Instead, 
the Circuit court found that El Hage had access to significant information, and the ability to 
disclose that information.  With no mention of any evidence that El Hage was likely disclose that 
                                                          
108 United States v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74, 78 (2nd Cir. 2000). 
109 Id. at 78-9.     
110 Referring to “reams of exhibits.” Id. 
111 Id., at 80. 
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information, no mention of the 1995 SAMs regulation regarding classified (rather than 
significant) information, and no suggestion that the information El Hage had was classified, the 
Second Circuit upheld El Hage’s SAMs on the basis of his capabilities alone.112 Acknowledging 
the contrast between this case and Felipe, namely that in this case there was no evidence of the 
inmate ever having engaged in dangerous communications, the Second Circuit maintained that 
El-Hage was dangerous because of what “information he might communicate to others.”113  One 
year prior to the 9/11 attacks, SAMs had already taken a wild leap forward in terms of earlier 
intervention and preventive action.  Evidence that harm was likely was apparently no longer 
necessary, the possibility of harm would be sufficient to impose SAMs. 
 As El Hage moved SAMs practice forward in terms of increasingly early interventions, 
the case of Yousef v. Reno114 significantly changed the level of judicial oversight of SAMs.  It is 
surprising that the Yousef case so moved SAMs doctrine; Yousef was held under SAMs after his 
conviction, so there was no question as to whether he was a terrorist or had terrorist associates.  
As to the risk that Yousef posed from jail, a jailhouse informant had told prosecutors that Yousef 
was plotting criminal acts from jail, even turning over to prosecutors handwritten notes 
containing evidence of Yousef’s schemes.115  There is little doubt that Yousef’s SAMs would 
have been upheld by any judge overseeing the case, had any judge truly overseen case.   
                                                          
112 Id. at 82. 
113 Id. at 82, emphasis added.  The court also emphasized that El-Hage’s confinement was less 
severe than Felipe’s had been, as he was allowed a cellmate and visits from his family members. 
114 Supra, note 68. 
115 U.S. v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003) at 165-6. 
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 Instead, the district court hearing Yousef’s case immediately dismissed his claims116 
based on the fact that Yousef had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies via the 
Administrative Remedy Program prior to appealing to the court.  Yousef’s appeal to the Circuit 
Court was merely a challenge of the district court’s holding.  He argued both that the Bureau of 
Prisons was powerless to modify his SAMs, which were in practice dictated by the Attorney 
General, and that the Bureau of Prisons had acknowledged this fact by responding to Yousef’s 
formal complaint with the statement that “this institution has no jurisdiction in this matter as the 
Special Administrative Measures were issued from the Attorney General’s Office.”117  These 
arguments failed to convince the court.  To the contrary, Yousef’s case created precedent that 
was quickly followed by a slew of courts in response to SAMs challenges.118 
                                                          
116 Yousef had made First Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment and due process 
arguments. 
117 quoted in Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d at 1222. 
118 See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 at 166 (2d Cir. 2003); Al-Owhali v. Ashcroft, 279 
F.Supp.2d 13 note 5 (D.D.C. 2003); United States v. Elzahabi ORDER of December 7, 2005, 
available at 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11004938886914500817&q=el+zahabi+december
+2005&hl=en&as_sdt=2,33; United States v. Ali, 2005 WL 2757939 (E.D. Va. Oct. 24, 2005); 
United States v. Sattar, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79328 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); U.S. v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 
210 (4th Cir. 2008); Ayyad v. Gonzales, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62863 (D. Colo. 2008). 
Not every court has followed this lead.  In 2005, Vincent Basciano was briefly released 
from the SAMs under which he was held after a judge in New York’s Eastern District found 
exhaustion of administrative remedies was unnecessary.  United States v. Basciano, 369 F. Supp. 
2d 344, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).  It is worth noting that this case was not a terrorism-associated 
case.  In 2008, two separate district courts found that the exhaustion requirement did not apply to 
motions “brought to court in the context of an already-pending action” as opposed to new 
actions.  United States v. Hashmi, 621 F.Supp.2d 76, 85-6 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Ayyad v. Gonzales, 
D.D.C. No. 05-cv-02342, Order of July 31, 2008.  This was based on an analysis of the 
legislative intent behind the Prison Litigation Reform Act , 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a) (from which the 
exhaustion requirement stems), which they found to be one of lessening the financial burden on 
courts.  The relatively inexpensive nature of a new motion in an already existing action, as 
opposed to the creation of an entirely new case and claim, led these courts to the conclusion that 
the exhaustion requirement did not apply.   
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 In these ways, judges allowed SAMs practice to become increasingly preventive in the 
years preceding 2001; first by requiring less proximity to criminal activity prior to allowing 
detention, and second by ceding oversight of SAMs to the executive branch.  Even as the SAMs 
regulations abandoned the requirement of hearings for extended confinement, and in the face of 
BOP admission that no due process could be obtained through administrative review, the judicial 
branch abandoned its oversight of the executive branch.  This gave the executive branch 
unchecked authority to detain defendants, pretrial (let alone pre-conviction), in solitary 
confinement, in cases that would often go on for years before reaching trail.   
 The examples of Syed Hashmi and Mohamed Warsame are telling.  Warsame’s 
detention, which was spent entirely under SAMs, was claimed by his lawyers to have been the 
longest in U.S. history.119  Warsame was known to have terrorist connections, to have trained at a 
terrorist training camp, and to have been communicating with terrorists prior to his arrest.120  
However, the judge on Warsame’s case seemed unconvinced of his dangerousness, at one point 
making a specific finding that SAMs were unnecessary.121 Even at sentencing, the judge 
remained unconvinced of Warsame’s dangerousness.122  Yet in spite of both this hesitancy and 
the judge’s order, Warsame’s SAMs were never removed.   
 As was mentioned above, the government’s evidence of dangerousness in the case of 
Syed Hashmi seems similarly weak.  Outside of the support he had provided to a high ranking 
                                                          
119 U.S. v. Warsame, Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Conditional Release from the Longest 
Pretrial Imprisonment in United States History, July 13, 2008 (on file with author). 
120 U.S. v. Warsame sentencing transcript (on file with author).  See also United States v. 
Warsame memorandum opinion on sentencing August 24, 2009 (on file with author). 
121 U.S. v. Warsame Order on Motion for Release Based on Changed Circumstances, August 31, 
2007, at 10 (on file with author).   
122 Warsame sentencing transcript, supra note 120, at 36-37. 
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member of a terrorist group, the concern regarding Hashmi appeared to center around the 
individuals he was associated with.  The government alleged that Hashmi had served as a go-
between for two terrorists who had been involved with a terror conspiracy in the United 
Kingdom, however it did not allege that Hashmi himself had any knowledge of how to build 
bombs or engage in any other violent acts, or that he could direct (or even ask) these other 
terrorists to engage in violence on his behalf.  To the contrary, the government informant in the 
case had stated that topics of importance were avoided in front of Hashmi, because he was an 
outsider, not a member of al Qaeda, and rather a member of a public, political group that was not 
involved in violence.123  A claim that Hashmi had made threats that terrorists would avenge his 
being held in prison was dropped prior to a 2008 motion to renew Hashmi’s SAMs.124  Yet 
Hashmi was held under SAMs for three years prior to his agreement to plead guilty, and has been 
so confined since that plea. 
 The judicial abandonment in evidence in the El Hage and Yousef cases paved the way for 
contemporary SAMs practice, overly preventive and insufficiently critical of government 
allegations, such as in the Hashmi and Warsame cases described above.  Those two cases show 
the reaches of the preventive attitude in contemporary SAMs practice.  It is difficult to see how, 
in either case, sufficient evidence of a likelihood of dangerousness could have been presented to 
justify the defendants’ detentions.  Yet by early 2001 SAMs practice had become so preventive 
that even the possibility of terrorist connections was sufficient for judges to abandon the SAMs 
determination to the executive branch.  Moreover, this development was, by late 2001, clearly 
                                                          
123 United States v. Hashmi transcript of proceedings June 1, 2007 (on file with author). 
124 SAMs renewal memorandum attached to United States v. Hashmi defense memorandum of 
December 22, 2008 re def. mot. for Modification of Pretrial Conditions of Detention (on file with 
author). 
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established law.  The case of Richard Reid shows how established SAMs practice was by this 
time. 
SAMs As A Foregone Conclusion: What We Learn from Richard Reid 
 Richard  Reid was arrested after trying and failing to detonate a bomb in his shoe in 
December of 2001, mere months after the 2001 attacks.125  Because Reid was arrested 
immediately after a failed attack, not to mention so shortly after the 2001 attacks, it is 
unsurprising that he was soon placed under SAMs.  But the particular reaction of the judge 
overseeing his case shows just how established SAMs practice was at that time.   
 In Judge Young, Richard Reid had happened to find a judge particularly ideologically 
opposed to the extremities of the so-called “War on Terror.”    In 2003 he was quoted saying 
“Mr. Reid is a very tall individual.  But he’s not ten feet tall.  And this constant reiteration of 
we’ve got to keep data away from him, we’ve got to keep his data out of the hands of the public 
lest disaster befall, respectfully, is wearing a bit thin.”126  He further expressed his concern that 
the government was going to spirit Reid off to Guantanamo, a concern which had resulted in an 
order that Reid not be moved without the prior permission of the court,127 and he maintained that 
Reid’s attorneys would not be forced to sign the affirmation generally required in SAMs cases, 
noting the ongoing prosecution of Lynne Stewart.128  In fact, upon first seeing the SAMs this 
                                                          
125 United States v. Reid criminal complaint, on file with author.  Although unknown to the FBI 
at the time of the filing of the complaint, Reid’s shoe was not only wired but laced with TATP 
and PETN, a combination later used by Umar Abdulmutallab (the “Underwear Bomber” or 
“Christmas Bomber”) (U.S. v. Abdulmutallab indictment on file with author). 
126 Quoted in United States v. Reid, 214 F.Supp.2d 84 (D. Mass. 2002). 
127 Id. 
128 Lynne Stewart was charged for, and ultimately convicted of providing material support to a 
terrorist by enabling that terrorist to evade the SAMs under which he had been placed.  Tamar R. 
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judge had ordered the SAMs lifted,129  reasoning that “the SAMs did not apply to Reid, as he was 
a pre-trial (sic) detainee presumed to be innocent.”130   
 Yet Judge Young not only ended up backtracking from his assertion of Reid’s presumed 
innocence, he was outright embarrassed that he had ever said it.  In July of 2002 Judge Young set 
forth an opinion reinstating the SAMs and stating, in his words, he “botched it.”131  His opinion 
drips with shame at the way in which he misread law.  The extent of embarrassment of this 
ideologically opposed judge suggests that the extent to which SAMs practice was established at 
that time.  Were SAMs not so clearly established to be within the prerogative of the executive 
branch, with or without proof of dangerousness, it is highly unlikely that a judge so concerned 
with the excesses of counterterrorism would respond with this embarrassment, rather than with a 
careful and limited admission of the reasons SAMs were justified in Reid’s particular case.  
Judge Young’s complete abdication of his objections shows that SAMs in 2002 were anything 
but new or reactionary.  Instead, Judge Young had to acknowledge they were already customary, 
traditional, and generally accepted, hence his embarrassment at having foolishly seen them as 
exceptional when first confronted with the issue.  The general acceptance of SAMs is further 
evident in the response from legal practitioners and academics, or more accurately, the lack 
thereof.  This lack is discussed in the next section. 
 
                                                          
Birckhead. The Conviction of Lynne Stewart and the Uncertain Future of the Right to Defend, 43 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
129 United States v. Reid, supra note 126. 
130 Id. at 89. 
131 Id. 
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A Lackluster Response: The deafening silence of the legal community 
 If Judge Young’s embarrassment shows the judiciary’s acceptance of executive 
authority to impose SAMs unilaterally, the silence of the legal community, both in practice and 
in academia, shows its acceptance in the broader legal culture.  Legal academia showed almost 
no interest in the psychological hardship that the solitary confinement of SAMs entails, or in the 
fact that defendants might be placed under SAMs with little or no articulated justification.  
Instead, civil liberties advocates, defense attorneys, and legal scholars focused on the impact on 
defendants’ abilities to aid in their representation, or the effect of the attorney/client monitoring 
provision that was added to SAMs regulations in 2001.  In fact, SAMs were almost entirely 
ignored by the legal academic community until this provision was passed.  Winter of 2001-2002 
saw the publication of two articles, an exponential increase from the zero articles that had 
published prior to 2001, both of which referenced SAMs solely in the context of the new 
attorney/client monitoring provision.132   
In the spring of 2002 the floodgates opened, and by December 2010 80 law review 
articles and professional legal publications had made reference to SAMs.  But of these articles, 
55 mentioned SAMs solely in the context of either the Lynne Stewart case or the attorney/client 
monitoring provision.  Only ten articles mentioned solitary confinement in the context of SAMs 
and outside of an introduction to the Stewart case, only six of these explore or even mention the 
effects these conditions may have on the inmate.  Even those articles that did discuss the 
                                                          
132 Mark G. Young, NOTE: What Big Eyes and Ears You Have!: A New Regime for Covert 
Governmental Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017 (2001); Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose 
Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of COINTELPRO and the 
Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent. 81 OR. L. REV. 1051 (2002) 
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psychological effect of SAMs emphasized the practical hurdles that SAMs create regarding trial 
preparation, rather than the harsh nature of SAMs themselves.133 
In reacting this way, legal academics appear to have been following the lead of the 
practitioners working on the cases who had, over the years, abandoned any claims of 
psychological hardship to their clients. In the early years of pretrial solitary confinement, the 
effect of solitary on inmates’ well being comes up rarely, but it does appear.  In Gotti, for 
example, the opinion closes with recognition of the defendants’ “understandable desire to live as 
comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible during confinement.”134  In 
Suleiman, the judge opens his opinion by stating his sympathy for Suleiman’s claim that his 
solitary confinement is affecting his mental health.  In El Hage, the court acknowledged that El 
Hage had already been held for a long period of time, and was likely to remain in solitary for 
much longer, and seemed to be influenced at least in part by the fact that El Hage had already 
been allowed to have a cellmate.135  Further, the very fact that El Hage’s conditions of 
confinement had been modified in order to allow for a cellmate suggests some sensitivity on the 
part of the district court.136 
                                                          
133 See, e.g., Schmidt and Dratel, supra note 18 at 71   
the defendant is focused on alleviating the onerous conditions rather than on the 
substance of the case. As a result, counsel is forced to develop a defense strategy 
without input from the client. In addition, counsel must spend an inordinate 
amount of time attempting to ameliorate the conditions by negotiating with prison 
officials, prosecutors, and, if necessary, the court. Furthermore, because the 
defendant is denied access to outside media, he or she cannot provide guidance 
and commentary with respect to potential occurrences that may have a bearing on 
the case, or warrant further investigation or exploration. 
134 755 F. Supp. at 1165. 
135 213 F.3d at 78-9.     
136 Sam Schmidt and Joshua Dratel further suggest that the district court’s refusal to grant a 
severance in the case was in part based on sympathy for “the significant negative impact of the 
S.A.M.’s on the defendants and their ability to prepare and contribute to their defense.”  Schmidt 
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Once again, the Yousef case stands as a seeming death knell for SAMs argument.  Yousef 
had clearly raised an argument regarding the effect solitary confinement had on his well-being—
his Eighth Amendment claims could be based on little else.137  But with the dismissal of 
Yousef’s claim not only judges but defense attorneys seem to have abandoned the argument that 
pretrial solitary confinement could be overseen on the basis of the effect it has on defendants.  
Following this case, the argument that the solitary confinement included as an aspect of SAMs 
was either punitive or simply cruel disappeared from the majority of cases.138 Where it was 
brought – most often in pro se motions by convicted inmates at the Supermax facility in 
Florence, Colorado -- it was quickly dismissed or abandoned.139   
In other words, claims of hardship were brought only by persons who were not legally 
educated, and who, one might say, could not see the writing on the wall.  Defense attorneys, in 
contrast, saw not only from SAMs cases but from conventional solitary confinement suits that 
the Eighth Amendment was a losing argument.  Aside from the generally accepted doctrine that 
solitary confinement does not violate the Eighth Amendment, dismissals might be based on a 
                                                          
and Dratel, supra note 18 at 73, ftnt 9, citing United States v. bin Laden, 109 F. Supp. 2d 211, 
213-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
137 254 F.3d at 1216 
138 See United States v. Esawi, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1695 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Al-Owhali v. 
Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2003); United States v. Abu Ali, 396 F. Supp. 2d 703 
(E.D.Va. 2005); Basciano v. Martinez, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56913 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); but see 
Sattar v. Gonzales, supra note 15. 
139 United States v. Troya, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118574 (S.D. Fla. 2008) without Eighth 
Amendment challenge United States v. Troya, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71525 (S.D. Fla. 2008); 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73372 (D. Colo. 2008); Sattar v. Gonzales, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
112428 (D. Colo. 2008) adopted by Sattar v. Gonzales, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21699 (D. Colo. 
2008); Shaaban Shaaban Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69211  (D. 
Colo. 2009) adopted by Shaaban Shaaban Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 69205 (D. Colo., Aug. 5, 2009); Allmon v. Bureau of Prisons, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
127183 (D. Colo. 2009) adopted by Allmon v. Bureau of Prisons, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52390 
(D. Colo., May 26, 2010); Jabarah v. Garcia, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107838 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(dismissing claim as moot). 
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failure to exhaust administrative remedies,140 or on the basis of mootness as SAMs were adjusted 
and prisoners were transferred to new facilities.141  These responses echoed those in conventional 
Supermax cases, where deference to prisons’ administrative decisions was clearly overtaking any 
oversight role the judiciary had once played.142  By pressing claims of interference with trial 
preparation instead, defense attorneys made a calculated effort to use an argument that 
maintained some chance of winning.  Their abandonment of the hardship argument shows once 
again how fully established it was that imposition on defendants’ well-being was within the 
prerogatives of the executive, even prior to any determination of guilt or dangerousness.   
  
                                                          
140 See note 88, supra, and accompanying text. 
141 United States v. Elzahabi, supra note 118; Hale v. Ashcroft, 683 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Colo. 
2009); Reid v. Wiley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98162 (D. Colo. 2010).  
142 Craig Haney and Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Pscyhological Analysis of 
Supermax and Solitary Confinement. 23 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. AND SOCIAL CHANGE 477 (1997); Reiter, 
supra note 12; Swearingen, supra note 12. 
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Conclusion 
 SAMs provide an excellent case study of the devolving checks on the executive branch in 
areas concerning public safety and suspected dangerous individuals.  SAMs provide the harshest 
imposition on liberty allowed in the criminal justice system outside of death, but may be imposed 
on defendants who have not been convicted, have not been tried, and against whom the 
government has provided no evidence of dangerousness or necessity for SAMs.  Instead, 
according to at least one prosecutor, an indictment on terrorism charges is sufficient to justify the 
imposition of ADMAX solitary confinement.  In the interests of public safety, all questions of 
proof regarding the danger to the public disappear.  In the interests of public safety, the executive 
is allowed to make this decision unilaterally, with only a show of judicial oversight and no actual 
questions asked.   
The cases of Yousef and El Hage show that SAMs were established as an unchecked 
executive prerogative prior to the 2001 terror attacks.  While it is true that SAMs began as an 
exceptional measure, applied only when judges were provided with adequate evidence of its 
necessity, judges had abdicated this role prior to the terrorist attacks in September of 2001.  
Moreover, examination of the rhetoric and doctrine used to justify that abdication locate the lack 
of oversight of SAMs as part of the more general acceptance of ADMAX facilities, and the more 
general abdication of oversight of those facilities.  
The lack of surprise and attention paid to SAMs in the judiciary, the community of legal 
practitioners, and the community of legal academics shows just how established this practice 
was.  The increasing number of suspected terrorists in our prisons seems to have more to do with 
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the increased attention and accusation of “reflexive” application of SAMs than does any post- 
2001 change in practice.   
But can SAMs practice truly function as a case study in broader counter-terror excesses?  
It can and does.  SAMs practice is directly relevant to, for instance, the use of solitary 
confinement at Guantanamo.  SAMs not only represent a similar form of confinement, ADMAX 
facilities were the model for solitary confinement at Guantanamo.  Now that details of the 
limitations on attorney/client conversations are emerging, it appears that these as well were based 
off of SAMs restrictions.   
When Rear Admiral D.B. Woods, Commander of Joint Task Force-Guantanamo, issued 
an order providing for review of each and every piece of writing passed between detainees and 
their attorneys in December of 2011, a not-so-minor minor controversy erupted as defense 
attorneys expressed their outrage over the new regulations.143  The ability to engage in privileged 
conversation with clients is, in the words of the American Bar Association (“ABA”), “critical to 
a true adversarial process.”144  This right was irreversibly damaged by the oversight proposed.    
The Office of the Chief Defense Counsel at Guantanamo went so far as to issue a response 
                                                          
143 Memorandum From the Office of the Chief Defense Counsel Re: Professional Responsibility 
Guidance on the JTF-GTMO-CDR Orders Governing Written Communications Management for 
Detainees Involved in Military Commissions of 27 December 2011 and Governing Logistics of 
Defense Counsel Access to Detainees Involved in Military Commissions of 27 December 2011 
(Jan. 13, 2012) [Hereinafter “January 13th Memo”]; National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers News Release Dated January 13, 2012, available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/NewsReleases.aspx?id=23429 ; Laura Pitter, Guantanamo’s System of 
Injustice. SALON.COM January 19, 2012, available at 
http://www.salon.com/2012/01/19/guantanamos_system_of_injustice/ ; Letter from Samuel 
Seymour, President, New York City Bar Association (Feb. 16, 2012) (on file with author); Letter 
from William Robinson III, President, American Bar Association (Dec. 21, 2011) Available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/1-2011-Dec-21-ABA-Pres-Ltr-Re-
GTMO.pdf 
144 Robinson, Id. 
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directive recommending that detainees’ defense counsel refuse to comply with the Order.  The 
Ethics Advisory Committee of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers soon 
issued an opinion supporting this response.145 
Yet the Order itself claimed to be comparable to existing Bureau of Prisons [“BOP”] 
regulations.  In particular, the Order and its supporters pointed to provisions allowing for the use 
of SAMs, including providing for monitoring of attorney-client communications, as comparable 
to the new procedures.146 
Most telling is the response sent to the New York City Bar Association, after that 
Association wrote Jeh Johnson to complain about the procedures.  The Association wrote to 
detail the differences between the procedures implemented at Guantanamo and the extremely 
limited manner in which SAMs are meant to be applied.  General Mark Martins, having 
reviewed the letter, replied that while the Association might be correct about the requirements to 
implement SAMs de jure, in fact his observation of the ways in which SAMs were applied and 
overseen suggested that the Guantanamo procedures were not nearly so far off.147   
Of course, General Martins was correct.  The Association had focused on the broad 
sweep of the Guantanamo procedures, as far too vague and generalized to be comparable to 
SAMs.  Yet, as seen above, SAMs in practice are applied, now, to any defendant charged under a 
terrorism statute, with almost no question or oversight as to the specific threat posed by the 
                                                          
145 Opinion of the Ethics Advisory Committee of the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (Feb. 2012) Available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/2012-02-22-Disclosure-of-attorney-client-privileged-communications-
to-third-party-Guantanamo-Bay-Cuba.pdf 
146 Woods, supra note 42. 
147 Letter from General Mark Martins, 2/17/2012, on file with author. 
Forthcoming, 51 (1) Criminal Law Bulletin ___ (2014) 
43 
 
defendant.148  In other words, the government was quite well aware of the lack of oversight of 
SAMs and preventive detention in Article III courts, and proceeded to demand that lack of 
oversight in Guantanamo. 
Indeed, the entire phenomenon of Guantanamo may be explained as a government effort 
to claim the right to determine who needs to be punished, without the meddling interference of 
judges or juries.  In creating Guantanamo, as many authors have noticed, the government 
endeavored to create the opportunity to act entirely without judicial oversight.149  Guantanamo 
would allow the government to bypass frustrating limitations on the length of detention, 
historically created to ensure a jury or judge would check government allegations and force 
accusers to bring some proof of a reason to hold detainees.150  In other words, with Guantanamo, 
with black sites, and with drone strikes, the government found a way to avoid being caught up in 
any argument over the guilt or innocence of detainees.   
While black sites, drone strikes, and the use of indefinite detention at Guantanamo are 
extreme measures, the lack of oversight they display are not so far from the use of “short cuts” 
and “end-runs” around judicial oversight seen in late 20th century criminal justice alternatives.  
Yet SAMs may be an example of a “missing link” in comparisons between U.S. counterterror 
policies and U.S. criminal justice.  Through SAMs, the connection between accepted criminal 
justice practices and the application of those practices to the pursuit of terror suspects can be 
seen.  Rather than relying on vague accusations that the U.S. criminal justice system was already 
“harsh,” “preventive,” or “unilateral,” the development of SAMs shows just how the decrease in 
                                                          
148 See also statement of prosecutor in U.S. v. Sadequee, supra note 16, and accompanying text. 
149 Karen Greenberg THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO'S FIRST 100 DAYS (2009); Phillipe 
Sands, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD'S MEMO AND HTE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES (2008). 
150 Natalia Nicolaidis Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy and Public Trial. 26 AMERICAN CRIM. 
L. REV. 1489 (1988). 
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judicial oversight led to an exceptionally harsh and reflexive form of confinement, which, in fact, 
was used as a model for more infamous counterterror policies.  In this way, SAMs bridge the gap 
between domestic and international practices of detention and confinement, showing how much 
of this effort the executive had already accomplished towards unilateral preventive detention in 
the criminal justice system, over the course of the 20th century. 
 
